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Abstract 
Humans often punish non-cooperators in one-shot interactions among genetically-unrelated 
individuals. So-called altruistic punishment poses an evolutionary puzzle because it enforces a 
cooperation norm that benefits the whole group, but is costly for the punisher. Under the “big 
mistake” (or “mismatch”) hypothesis, social behavior such as punishment evolved by 
individual selection at a time when repeated interactions with kin prevailed. It then misfired in 
modern humans, who “mistakenly” apply it in sporadic interactions with unrelated 
individuals. In contrast, cultural group selection theories emphasize cultural differences in 
normative behavior and the role of intergroup competition and punishment for the emergence 
of large-scale cooperation in the absence of genetic relatedness. We conducted a series of 
multilateral-cooperation economic experiments with a sample of Spanish Romani people 
(Gitanos), who represent a unique cultural group to test the predictions of the two accounts: 
Gitano communities rely heavily on close kin-based networks, maintain high consanguinity 
rates and display a particularly strong sense of ethnic identity. A total of 320 Gitano and non-
Gitano (i.e., the majority Spanish population) participants played a one-shot public goods 
game with punishment in either ethnically homogeneous or ethnically mixed (half Gitano and 
half non-Gitano) four-person groups. In the homogeneous groups, punishment was commonly 
used by non-Gitanos but virtually inexistent among Gitanos. In the mixed groups, however, 
Gitanos who did not cooperate were severely punished by other Gitanos, but also by non-
Gitanos (particularly males in both cases). The results are more consistent with cultural group 
selection and also qualify some of its predictions.  
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Significance statement 
Punishment of free-riders plays a key role in sustaining human cooperation. Two leading 
theoretical accounts yield different predictions about who, and under what circumstances, 
should punish more. “Big-mistake” models suggest that “old” forms of social organization 
(based on kinship and closeness) should favor punishment, whereas cultural group selection 
theories suggest that punishment is favored in “modern” scenarios in response to competition 
between ethnocultural groups. Cooperation experiments with Spanish Gitanos, whose social 
life relies heavily on kinship and closeness, and non-Gitanos, who interact more with non-
relatives and on a larger scale, reveal that the presence of outgroups dramatically impacts 
punishment behavior. Gitanos punish less and only punish Gitano free-riders when there are 
non-Gitanos in the group. These results challenge “big-mistake” models.  
 
  
Introduction 
Humans possess an extraordinary capacity for large-scale cooperation and this stands as a 
theoretical puzzle across the biological and behavioral sciences. Mechanisms such as kin 
selection, and direct and indirect reciprocity have been proposed as explanations for the 
evolution of cooperation in relatively small populations (1-4). To explain prosocial behavior 
in large modern societies, however, kinship or reciprocity mechanisms seem to be insufficient 
because cooperation is observed in ephemeral encounters among unrelated individuals; for 
instance, in voting, driving, paying taxes, recycling, market interactions and warfare (5, 6). 
Decentralized (peer) punishment of free-riders has been shown to be a crucial element for 
understanding the emergence of cooperation beyond kinship and small-scale groups (6-10). 
So-called altruistic punishment is a kind of costly norm enforcement which cannot be 
explained by reputation or other traditional forms of reciprocity. Punishment is considered 
altruistic (in the biological sense) when the absolute benefits triggered by the enforcement of 
the cooperative norm are received by individuals other than the punisher (11).  
Even if groups in which peer punishment is allowed can outcompete those in which it is not 
due to the discouragement of free-riding (12, 13; but see 14), altruistic punishers are 
condemned to a lower evolutionary success within their group (15, 16). It turns out that the 
provision of a sanctioning system to prevent free-riding can be considered as a second-order 
social dilemma where individual and collective interests are in conflict (11, 17). Nevertheless, 
altruistic punishment is frequently observed in controlled experiments with unrelated human 
subjects, even in one-shot anonymous interactions (11, 18-20). In fact, the neurobiological 
evidence suggests that people suffer disutility from observing uncooperative behaviors (21-
23) and derive pleasure from punishing wrongdoers (23-25), which facilitates punishment 
decisions, even if they are costly. Yet the evolutionary basis of punishment behavior and its 
psychological underpinnings is subject to debate. Why do people pay irrecoverable costs to 
punish others? 
The “big mistake” (or “mismatch”) hypothesis (26-34) holds that the psychological 
mechanisms underlying group-beneficial behaviors, such as altruistic punishment, evolved in 
a period of human history in which nearly all social interactions were repeated and took place 
among close relatives. Thus, “traditional” reciprocity and/or kin selection mechanisms would 
lie behind the evolution of punishment, which emerged because under those circumstances 
punishing others benefits the individual’s (direct or indirect) inclusive fitness, for instance, by 
reducing future exploitation by others. Such pan-human social psychology, so the argument 
goes, misfires in the behavior of modern humans, who “mistakenly” use altruistic punishment 
even in one-shot interactions with unrelated individuals (i.e., where it is no longer adaptive or 
fitness enhancing). It is argued therefore that human social psychology is not programmed to 
differentiate between acquaintances and strangers, at least beyond the desire to cultivate and 
maintain individually profitable, coalitional social-exchange relationships. Different ecologies 
or environmental cues, however, would lead to different expressions of the common evolved 
psychology and thus create behavioral variation. 
On the other hand, following cultural group selection theories (6, 8-10, 35-43), those 
proximate mechanisms (i.e., the negative emotions associated to the observation of 
uncooperative acts and the positive emotions associated to their punishment) may be 
particularly suited for solving the second-order dilemma of punishment—and hence the first-
order dilemma of cooperation—in modern large-scale societies where one-shot interactions 
with non-relatives are common. Altruistic punishment would thus have been shaped following 
a complex process in which genes and culture co-evolve, with cultural adaptation being much 
more rapid than genetic adaptation. Under this account, different cultural groups develop the 
human “norm-psychology” (43) differently in the race for survival against other cultural 
groups. In particular, specific social behaviors which are advantageous for the group during 
intergroup competition are transmitted across individuals through social learning mechanisms 
(i.e., payoff- or frequency-biased imitation) and enforced through sanctions. Behavioral 
variation would not be the result of current ecology alone, as implied by the “mismatch” 
hypothesis, but of its interaction with cultural history as well. Therefore, it is likely that some 
cultural groups use decentralized punishment of free-riding extensively, while others are more 
lenient or most probably use it to enforce different norms. Intergroup encounters and 
associated group identity cues, to the extent that they elicit differential behavioral patterns, 
play a fundamental role in the predictions of cultural group selection models. Not in vain, the 
selection of prosocial behaviors by cultural evolution hinges upon their ability to benefit the 
cultural group in the process of intergroup competition. Thus, under this account, human 
social psychology is essentially programmed to differentiate between acquaintances and 
strangers and, more specifically, between ingroup and outgroup individuals, as this distinction 
is key to the success of one’s own cultural group. 
To test the predictive power of these two accounts of altruistic punishment, we conducted a 
series of lab-in-the-field economic experiments with a unique sample of Spanish Romani 
people (Gitanos, also referred to as Calé). Romani groups represent the largest ethnocultural 
minority in Europe.* Gitanos constitute a paradigmatic case study for the purposes of this 
paper because: (i) kinship is at the core of their social life and organization even if they live a 
“modern” life, which in many other aspects resembles that of their non-Gitano neighbors (i.e., 
the majority Spanish population). Indeed, consanguinity rates within Gitano communities in 
the geographic area of the study are among the highest ever reported in Europe, at the upper 
bound of the range observed in traditional small-scale societies of hunter-gatherers and 
horticulturalists which are considered to resemble the living conditions of ancestral humans 
(see Text S1 in the Supplementary Information). (ii) Gitanos display a strong sense of ethnic 
identity although in many ways share a bicultural identity (47, 48). While they mostly speak 
the majorities’ languages and have adopted the religion and even a number of their neighbors’ 
mores, they also maintain a strong and vibrant sense of themselves as a separate people. 
Gitanos try to preserve a separate ethnic identity, often reinventing their processes of 
differentiation, which are mainly based on reproductive strategies where specific factors 
including marriage, gender and kin systems are crucial (49-52). As a consequence, for 
                                                 
*Nonetheless, they have received little attention in experimental research. We are aware of only two studies 
analyzing the behavior of Romani people: Brañas-Garza et al. (44) using the ultimatum game and Martín et al. 
(45) using time discounting tasks. Behavior towards Romani people, but not their own behavior, is studied in 
Bauer et al. (46). 
example, even though Gitanos and non-Gitanos have cohabited the study area for more than 
15 generations, mixed marriages have been traditionally rare (less than 5% for over two 
centuries in the study area). Although this is changing in some areas where the integration of 
Gitanos in education and labor has been notable, according to our data cross-ethnic marriages 
in the localities studied still remain under the 10% mark. Interestingly, recent advances 
suggest that societies with more intensive kin-based institutions tend to display a stronger 
ethnocultural (group) identity, ingroup-outgroup differentiation and ingroup loyalty (53). † See 
Text S1 in the Supplementary Information for more details. 
 
Design and Hypotheses 
We conducted our experiments with a total of 320 participants (mean age = 42.80 ± 18.42 SD, 
59% females). Participants played a one-shot public goods game with peer punishment (PGP) 
involving real monetary stakes in anonymous four-person groups. We recruited Gitano and 
non-Gitano “ordinary people” from five small semi-rural towns with a large Gitano 
population in southern Spain. The experimental design comprises two conditions (between-
subjects): participants played the PGP in either (i) homogeneous groups composed of either 
only Gitanos or only non-Gitanos or (ii) mixed groups with two Gitano and two non-Gitano 
members. Importantly, the two conditions were run in different sessions. Thus, ethnic identity 
was made particularly salient in the mixed sessions because in the homogenous sessions there 
were only members of one’s own cultural group. Ethnicity itself is indeed rather meaningless 
until the presence of “others” makes it relevant for social interaction and cultural 
identification processes (58-61). While among minority status groups, such as Gitanos, group 
identity is often carried to every public environment (62), in the mixed condition the behavior 
of the two cultural groups could be directly compared by the participants, which should 
enhance the salience of intergroup encounter cues and hence of ethnic identity.  
Following standard procedures (18), participants in the PGP first made their cooperation 
decisions by means of (anonymously) allocating money from their €10 endowment to a group 
pot. Contributions were doubled and evenly shared among the four group members. Thus, the 
more one contributes to the group pot (i.e., the public good), the larger the total group benefit, 
but the lower the decision maker’s personal benefit, all else equal. This creates the classical 
social dilemma between collective and individual interests. After all the participants had made 
their decisions, they were shown the contributions of each of the other three group members 
and were allowed to spend part of their earnings in order to reduce others’ earnings 
(punishment stage): €1 spent on punishment reduced the target individual’s earnings by €3. It 
is important to remark that participants contributed knowing beforehand that they could be 
punished, which introduces strategic incentives to cooperate in order to avoid punishment.  
                                                 
† Gitanos, as other Romani groups, have developed a series of autonomous law-making processes that are often 
encoded in open-ended codes of norms, the Gitano Law. Although somewhat less elaborated than in Romani 
groups in Eastern Europe (54-56), these processes are important in the effort to limit the escalation of conflicts 
between families and descent networks, where the duty of defense and support of family members is a central 
concern (57). 
Finally, by means of a subtle procedure which preserved participants’ anonymity, we allowed 
participants in the mixed groups to match the ethnicity and contributions of each of the other 
three group members. Hence, our procedure let participants condition their punishment 
decisions on the target’s ethnic identity. Note that this was not relevant in the homogenous 
groups since all four members were of the same cultural group. See Methods for a more 
detailed description of the experimental procedures.  
The two evolutionary accounts we aim to test make clearly different predictions about our 
participants’ punishment behavior (see Table 1 and Figure 1 for schematic and visual 
representations of the predictions, respectively): 
 If the “big mistake” (BM) hypothesis is correct, in the homogenous groups, 
Gitanos should use altruistic punishment of free-riders to a similar extent as non-
Gitanos because both can be considered as “modern” humans whose current 
punishment behavior represents the misfiring of a pan-human psychology (that 
emerged in a common ancestral past where kinship- and closeness-based 
interactions prevailed). If anything, one should expect misfiring to be more 
prominent among Gitanos. In other words, if punishment evolved because it yields 
direct or indirect inclusive fitness benefits to the punisher, Gitanos might in general 
punish free-riders more frequently than non-Gitanos due to their higher genetic 
relatedness and closer daily-life relationships. Moreover, the presence of members 
of the other cultural group in the mixed groups should not dramatically influence 
behavior except for a possible reduction in aggregate punishment (especially by 
Gitanos) compared to the homogeneous groups along with the associated reduction 
of cues of genetic relatedness and the diminished likelihood of establishing 
coalitional social-exchange relationships among the interactants. Intergroup 
processes are considered to be evolutionarily irrelevant for the emergence of group-
beneficial behaviors. Therefore, although the punishment of ingroups might be 
slightly higher than that of outgroups, the target’s ethnic identity should be 
essentially disregarded by participants when punishing in mixed groups to the 
extent that potential coalition partners can be both targets and observers of one’s 
own behavior. Consequently, it is the group composition that is relevant to build a 
reputation of “formidability” (63). The level of punishment of ingroups in the 
homogeneous and mixed groups should, in any case, be identical. 
 On the other hand, following cultural group selection (CGS) theories, one may 
expect sharp differences between the two cultural groups in the homogenous 
condition. In the homogeneous groups, altruistic punishment is expected to be used 
more often by non-Gitanos, who interact more frequently with non-relatives and on 
a larger scale than Gitanos. In the mixed groups, however, the salience of ingroup-
outgroup identity cues should lead participants to impose harsher punishment onto 
ingroup vs. outgroup wrongdoers in order to preserve group cohesiveness and, in 
parallel, to punish outgroup cooperators more spitefully/antisocially (14, 64) as 
harming the outgroup helps one’s own cultural group outcompete other groups. 
Moreover, altruistic punishment of ingroup free-riders should be stronger in mixed 
than in homogeneous groups due to the priming of ethnic identity, whereas 
antisocial punishment of ingroup cooperators should be avoided in mixed groups 
and should therefore be stronger in homogeneous than mixed groups. The latter 
patterns would be expected to be more pronounced among Gitanos, who share a 
much more marked ethnic identity than the majority, and particularly males, as they 
gain leadership in intergroup encounters (65-67).  
 
Table 1. Basic predictions of the “big mistake” and cultural group selection hypotheses about 
altruistic (and antisocial) punishment behavior in the experiment. 
Hypothesis Homogeneous  Mixed Homogeneous vs. Mixed 
Big mistake - 
mismatch IG ≥ ING I ≥ O IH = IM 
Cultural group 
selection IG < ING 
  
I > O IH < IM 
----------------------- ------------------------- 
I < O (antisocial) IH > IM (antisocial) 
Notes: I = punishment targeted at ingroups. O = punishment targeted at outgroups. Subscripts G, NG, H 
and M refer to Gitano punishers, non-Gitano punishers, homogeneous groups and mixed groups, 
respectively. Antisocial punishment is labeled as “(antisocial)”. 
 
 
Figure 1. Visual representation of the predictions of the “big mistake” (BM, panel a) and 
cultural group selection (CGS, panel b) hypotheses. I = punishment targeted at ingroups. 
O = punishment targeted at outgroups. Subscripts G and NG refer to Gitano and non-Gitano 
punishers, respectively. Note that we do not plot the case of antisocial punishment because 
the BM hypothesis only entails predictions on altruistic punishment. 
 
We further test the norm-psychology account inherent to cultural group selection models by 
enumerating some secondary hypotheses linked to the differential cultural norms of Gitanos 
and non-Gitanos in the study area. This account states that human social psychology is unique 
in the animal kingdom because the human brain has differentially evolved to be highly 
sensitive to social norms, defined as “learned behavioral standards shared and enforced by a 
community” (43, p. 218). If the norm-psychology hypothesis is correct, Gitanos’ and non-
Gitanos’ behavior in the experiment should reflect such differences in cultural norms, which 
work as proximate-level behavioral explanations. In Text S1 in the Supplementary 
Information we explore some of those cultural differences and set the associated secondary 
(proximate-level) hypotheses, in particular about norm enforcement institutions and gender 
roles. 
 
Results 
Contributions to the public good. With regard to the participants’ cooperation as measured by 
their contributions to the public good, the results are displayed in Figure 2. No main effect of 
ethnicity or condition on contributions was found (ps > 0.22, OLS regression with robust 
standard errors and controlling for gender and age; see Figure 2a). The interaction between 
these two variables was not significant either (p > 0.27) and all possible comparisons report 
ps > 0.10 according to joint-significance Wald tests on the model estimates. Contribution 
levels were relatively high (well above 60% of the endowment on average; see 68). Given that 
the threat of punishment introduces incentives to cooperate strategically and therefore 
contributions do not necessarily reflect a “pure” preference for cooperation, the finding of 
similar average contribution levels across cultural groups and conditions could be due to 
multiple factors. 
However, we observed a significant interaction between gender and condition (p = 0.02; see 
Figure 2b and 2c): across both cultural groups (especially among non-Gitanos although the 
three-way interaction ethnicity X condition X gender was not significant, p = 0.65), we found 
that females contributed less in the homogenous than in the mixed groups (p = 0.01, Wald 
test), while the opposite was observed for males (although not significantly so, p = 0.33). As a 
result, males cooperated significantly less than females in the mixed groups (p = 0.04) but 
similarly in the homogeneous groups (p = 0.22). 
 
  
Figure 2. Mean contributions in homogeneous and mixed conditions. Panel (a) displays the 
data broken down by ethnicity. Panels (b) and (c) display the data broken down by gender for 
non-Gitanos and Gitanos, respectively. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
Aggregate punishment levels. Figure 3 summarizes the results regarding punishment 
behavior. We observed a significant main effect of ethnicity indicating that, in general, 
Gitanos punished less than non-Gitanos (p < 0.01, OLS regression with robust standard errors 
clustered at both the group and the individual level, and controlling for condition, gender, age, 
the difference in contributions between the punisher and the target and the mean contribution 
of the other two group members). The treatment condition did not yield a significant estimate 
(p = 0.89). A significant ethnicity X condition interaction (p < 0.01) reveals that Gitanos 
punished much less than their non-Gitano counterparts (p < 0.01, Wald test) in the 
homogeneous groups, but there were no ethnic differences in the mixed groups (p = 0.89; see 
Figure 3a). The intergroup encounter triggered by the mixed condition thus exerted substantial 
and differential effects on both sides: Gitanos increased their punishment level (p = 0.02) 
while non-Gitanos reduced it (p = 0.04), as compared to the homogenous condition.  
A significant interaction was also found between gender and condition (p < 0.01): we 
observed a higher level of punishment by males (p < 0.01, Wald test) and a lower level of 
punishment by females (p < 0.01) in the mixed than the homogenous groups (see Figure 3b 
and 3c). This results in males punishing less than females in the homogenous groups 
(p = 0.02) but more than females in the mixed groups (p < 0.01). Although the three-way 
interaction ethnicity X condition X gender was not significant (p = 0.55), it can be seen that 
Gitano females almost never used punishment in either condition. In other words, Gitano 
females’ punishment was nearly inexistent regardless of the condition whereas the level of 
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punishment implemented by Gitano males, which was negligible in the homogeneous groups, 
turned out to be rather high in the mixed groups. Among non-Gitanos, females punished less 
while males punished more in the mixed than in homogeneous groups.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean aggregate punishment in homogeneous and mixed conditions. Panel (a) 
displays the data broken down by ethnicity. Panels (b) (non-Gitanos) and (c) (Gitanos) 
display the data broken down by ethnicity and gender. Error bars represent robust standard 
error of the mean clustered at the group level. 
 
Altruistic and antisocial punishment. In all regressions, the higher the difference between 
the punisher’s contribution and the target’s contribution (punisher’s minus target’s), the 
stronger the punishment (ps < 0.01), thus indicating that more intense free-riding metes out 
firmer punishment. However, we also observe some instances of spiteful, antisocial 
punishment targeted at cooperators. When disentangling between “altruistic” punishment (the 
target contributed less than the punisher) and “antisocial” punishment (the target contributed 
more than the punisher) in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4, we see that the rather strong 
punishment implemented by Gitanos, in particular males (panels c and d break down the data 
by gender), in the mixed compared to the homogeneous groups is due uniquely to altruistic 
punishment since their level of antisocial punishment was still very low in the mixed groups. 
The remaining results mentioned above do not appear to crucially depend, at least 
qualitatively, on whether punishment is altruistic or antisocial.  
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Figure 4. Mean altruistic and antisocial punishment in homogeneous and mixed conditions. 
Panels (a) (altruistic punishment) and (b) (antisocial punishment) display the data broken 
down by punisher’s ethnicity. Panels (c) (altruistic punishment) and (d) (antisocial 
punishment) display the data broken down by punisher’s ethnicity and gender. Error bars 
represent robust standard error of the mean clustered at the group level 
 
Ethnocultural identities and punishment in mixed groups. It remains to determine whether 
participants punished differently in the mixed groups depending on the cultural identity of the 
target (recall that the punisher knew the target’s ethnicity but not her personal identity). In 
Figure 5, we display the mean punishment levels imposed on Gitano and non-Gitano targets 
in the mixed groups. We find that, regardless of the punisher’s ethnicity, Gitano targets 
received less antisocial punishment and more altruistic punishment than non-Gitano targets 
for the same behaviors (significant interaction between contribution difference and target’s 
ethnicity, p < 0.01, OLS regression; the triple interaction with punisher’s ethnicity is not 
significant, p = 0.55; see Figure 5a and 5b). Put differently, both Gitano and non-Gitano 
punishers were more responsive to the distance between their own and the target’s 
contribution (i.e., to the relative level of free-riding) when the target was Gitano than when 
the target was non-Gitano. Gitano targets got punished significantly less than non-Gitano 
targets when they cooperated more than the punisher (p < 0.05 for differences larger than €4; 
Wald test), whereas Gitano targets got punished more than non-Gitano ones when they 
cooperated less than the punisher (p < 0.05 for differences larger than €3). As can be seen in 
Figure 5c and 5d, the difference in altruistic punishment is due solely to male punishers, 
whereas the difference in antisocial punishment is similar across genders, although it appears 
to be stronger among non-Gitano female punishers.  
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Figure 5. Mean punishment on Gitano and non-Gitano targets in mixed groups. Panels (a) 
(altruistic punishment) and (b) (antisocial punishment) display the data broken down by 
punisher’s ethnicity. Panels (c) (altruistic punishment) and (d) (antisocial punishment) 
display the data broken down by punisher’s ethnicity and gender. Error bars represent robust 
standard error of the mean clustered at the group level. 
 
To summarize, Gitanos practically did not punish the misbehavior of other Gitanos in the 
homogeneous groups but (in particular males) severely punished such behavior in the mixed 
groups with non-Gitanos. Non-Gitano males, on the other hand, also retaliated more harshly 
against Gitano free-riders than against non-Gitano ones in the mixed groups. Regarding the 
antisocial punishment of cooperators, the results are somehow weaker: while participants 
tended to target more punishment at non-Gitano than Gitano cooperators in the mixed groups, 
the levels of antisocial punishment were relatively low (especially compared to those of 
altruistic punishment). 
A closer look into the basic competing hypotheses. In Figure 6a we rearrange the above 
results regarding the altruistic punishment of free-riders in a manner that facilitates 
comparison with Table 1 and Figure 1, which presented the predictions of the two accounts. 
Although the BM hypothesis does not yield predictions about antisocial punishment targeted 
at cooperators, Figure 6b displays the results on antisocial punishment for the sake of 
completeness.  
With regards to altruistic punishment (Figure 6a), from the homogeneous condition we 
observe, following the notation used in Table 1, that IG < ING (p < 0.01). Thus, the punishment 
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targeted at ingroup free-riders in the homogeneous groups is higher among non-Gitanos than 
among Gitanos, as predicted by the CGS account. In the mixed groups, we can see that I > O 
holds for Gitanos, indicating that ingroup free-riders get punished more harshly than outgroup 
ones, whereas the opposite is true for non-Gitanos (p < 0.05 for differences between the 
punisher’s and the target’s contributions larger than €3 in both cases; see above). Here, the 
results for non-Gitano punishers do not fit into the basic predictions of any of the two 
accounts, but the results for Gitano punishers match the predictions of both accounts. Finally, 
we also observe that IH < IM holds among Gitanos (p < 0.01 for all possible differences 
between the punisher’s and the target’s contributions), meaning that ingroup free-riders get 
punished more in the mixed than in the homogeneous groups, while the opposite is observed 
among non-Gitanos, albeit marginally (p < 0.10 for differences between the punisher’s and 
the target’s contributions larger than €1). Again, both accounts fail to predict the behavior of 
non-Gitano punishers. The CGS hypothesis, however, gives a good approximation to the 
behavior of Gitano punishers. 
Figure 6c displays the results on altruistic punishment for male and female punishers 
separately. As mentioned above, Gitano females practically did not punish in any condition. 
In addition, the IG < ING finding from the homogeneous groups and the IH > IM finding for non-
Gitanos hold qualitatively regardless of the punisher’s gender, whereas the I > O (I < O) 
observed among Gitanos (non-Gitanos) in the mixed groups as well as the IH < IM among 
Gitanos are only driven by male punishers. 
As for the antisocial punishment of cooperators (Figure 6b), the prediction of the CGS 
hypothesis that outgroup cooperators should mete out more punishment than ingroup ones 
(I < O (antisocial) in Table 1) accurately describes the data when focusing on Gitano 
punishers. However, the opposite pattern (I > O (antisocial)) is observed among non-Gitano 
punishers, also contrary to the predictions of the CGS account (p < 0.05 for differences 
between the target’s and the punisher’s contributions larger than €4 in both cases; see above). 
On the other hand, to the extent that the presence of ingroup-outgroup identity cues should 
make individuals direct any competitive desires (and efforts) toward the outgroup, a CGS 
approach also predicts that IH > IM (antisocial). That is, the existence of any instances of 
ingroup antisocial punishment in homogeneous groups must be suppressed in mixed groups. 
This prediction is met among the Gitano punishers (p < 0.10 for differences larger than €7, 
p ≤ 0.05 for differences larger than €8) but not for non-Gitano ones (p > 0.31 for all possible 
differences). 
Breaking down the results on antisocial punishment by gender in Figure 6d, we see that both 
the I < O (antisocial) and IH > IM (antisocial) findings for Gitano punishers hold qualitatively 
for both males and females (with the disclaimer that females punish very little), whereas the 
I > O (antisocial) observed for non-Gitanos is only driven by male punishers. Also, when 
comparing the ingroup antisocial punishment between the homogeneous and mixed 
conditions among non-Gitano punishers, we observe IH < IM (antisocial) for males, that is, the 
opposite of what is predicted by the CGS account and is met for Gitano punishers. 
 
  
Figure 6. Mean altruistic and antisocial punishment targeted at ingroups and outgroups. 
Panels (a) (altruistic punishment) and (b) (antisocial punishment) display the data broken 
down by punisher’s ethnicity and treatment condition (ingroup-homogeneous, ingroup-mixed 
and outgroup-mixed). Panels (c) (altruistic punishment) and (d) (antisocial punishment) 
display the data broken down by punisher’s ethnicity, treatment condition and punisher’s 
gender. Error bars represent robust standard error of the mean clustered at the group level. 
 
Discussion 
Our experiments yield new insights into the evolutionary roots of human prosocial behavior 
and altruistic punishment in particular. Given that Gitanos’ use of punishment in the 
homogeneous groups was nearly inexistent, especially compared to that of non-Gitanos, our 
data seem to be inconsistent with the “big mistake” or “mismatch” hypothesis. Under this 
hypothesis, Gitanos should punish similarly or slightly more than non-Gitanos on average 
because, while also being “modern” humans (i.e., citizens of modern states), their social 
organization is more heavily based on kinship, family networks and closeness. The 
explanation would be that group-beneficial behaviors such as altruistic punishment evolved at 
a time when nearly all social interactions were among relatives and reputation was always at 
stake. Thus, altruistic punishment would have been selected through kin selection and/or 
“traditional” reciprocity mechanisms given that its use tended to confer inclusive fitness 
benefits to the punisher in ancestral, small-scale human groups. Such an evolved psychology 
should be equally or more clearly displayed by Gitanos who are still heavily organized around 
kinship and close relationships in contrast to non-Gitanos, who have more frequent sporadic 
encounters with non-relatives. Our results do not support this prediction.  
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On the other hand, if altruistic punishment is particularly important for the enforcement of 
cooperation among non-kin in large-scale societies, as argued by theorists of cultural group 
selection, non-Gitanos should punish more than Gitanos in homogeneous groups. This is what 
we observe. The results from Henrich and Henrich (69) suggest that relatedness might reduce 
the willingness to punish others, since they found that individuals more genetically related to 
the average member of the “yavusa” in a Yasawan sample (Fiji Islands) tended to punish less 
as third-party observers. Moreover, in such a highly genetically-related population, 
punishment was comparatively infrequent, and zero offers were very often accepted in both 
ultimatum and third-party punishment games, whereas actual offers were on average quite 
high (i.e., “fair”). This matches the ultimatum game results of Brañas-Garza et al. (44) with a 
sample of Spanish Gitanos in Madrid, where high levels of cooperation were observed in the 
form of high offers even though much lower offers would have gone unpunished. In cultural 
groups organized around kinship-based networks, peer punishment may not be favored to 
enforce daily-life group cooperation if other mechanisms such as gossiping or centralized 
punishment institutions represent lower-cost solutions (given the short-run negative impact of 
punishment on the fitness of individuals who share genes with the punisher). Indeed, previous 
theoretical evidence suggests that punishment is typically selected against in environments of 
high genetic relatedness (70). Recent advances also indicate that public, multilateral 
cooperation can evolve by kin selection in sizeable groups in the absence of punishment if 
genetic relatedness is strong enough (values observed today in small-scale populations may 
suffice, e.g., 71) so that indirect inclusive fitness benefits act as a sufficiently powerful 
cooperation-enhancing force (72). In a related manner, experimental research suggests that 
cooperation, but not punishment, increases with cues of kin density in PGP groups (73). The 
exact role of genetic relatedness for punishment behavior is yet to be systematically assessed, 
however. 
In addition, as opposed to the arguments of the mismatch hypothesis, the existence of cultural 
selection processes predicts different manifestations of the same behavior (i.e., punishment 
toward members of one’s own cultural group) in intergroup encounters compared to situations 
where group identity cues are absent, and this is again what we observe. Gitanos (but only 
males), who have a strong sense of ethnic identity, targeted punishment at Gitano wrongdoers 
when they interacted with non-Gitanos in the mixed groups but not in the only-Gitano 
homogeneous groups. This observation is consistent with the hypothesis that punishment 
plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation through its impact on intergroup 
processes. At the proximate level, we interpret this result as reflecting that Gitano males use 
punishment only in response to a clear threat to group identity (74, 75): that of being seen as 
less cooperative than non-Gitanos. The negative emotions triggering punishment (11, 21, 23) 
among Gitanos would thus emanate from the possibility of comparison between the two 
ethnic groups. Previous research indicates that, during intergroup contact, feelings of identity 
threat are particularly likely to be aroused among individuals with a stronger group 
identification (61, 76). It can thus be inferred that the key norm for Gitanos (that which is to 
be enforced) is not cooperation per se, but preserving an ethnic identity of which they are 
proud.‡ This result is to a large extent coherent with previous results from ultimatum game 
experiments (77-79) and multilateral gift-giving (non-standard) third-party punishment games 
(80) using identity manipulations.  
However, the latter finding seems at odds with most results from standard third-party 
punishment experiments in which harsher punishment has been observed when the victim is 
an ingroup of the third-party (i.e., the punisher) and the norm violator is an outgroup, 
compared to other combinations (81-87; but see Shinada et al. (80) for a non-standard design 
with different results). In contrast to results with adults, a recent third-party punishment 
experiment found that three to four-year-olds, but not older children (see also 84), inflict 
harsher punishment onto ingroup than outgroup norm-violators (88). Yet there are important 
differences between the multilateral cooperation environment of our PGP and the framework 
posed by the third-party punishment game in those experiments. For instance, the punisher is 
directly affected by the norm violation in the former but not in the latter. Also, both ingroups 
and outgroups can be victims (and observers) of the norm violation at the same time in the 
PGP but not in the third-party punishment game. Likewise, punishers might have been more 
cooperative than the target, or less, in the third-party punishment game, but this fundamental 
detail—which informs about the true nature of punishment (14, 64, 89)—is by design 
unknown (but see 80), in contrast to the PGP. Exploring the possible reasons for the 
inconsistencies between experimental frameworks (and between young children and adult 
behavior) is an interesting endeavor for future research.  
Non-Gitano males’ sanctioning behavior, on the other hand, is closer to what previous 
experiments using (standard) third-party punishment games with adults have shown: they 
punish outgroup wrongdoers harshly but not ingroup ones in mixed groups. Indeed, the lowest 
level of altruistic punishment by non-Gitano males is observed when the wrongdoer is an 
ingroup and there are outgroup “third-party” victims, whereas the maximum level of 
punishment is targeted at outgroup wrongdoers when there are ingroup third-party victims. 
When both the wrongdoer and the third-party victims are ingroups (i.e., in homogenous 
groups), their punishment remains at intermediate levels. Seen in this way, these behavioral 
patterns resemble previous observations from third-party punishment games with adults (see, 
for instance, 81). Non-Gitanos’ punishment behavior in mixed groups, therefore, seems 
inconsistent with the basic predictions of cultural group selection theories—but also with 
those of the mismatch hypothesis. It might be that the lower strength of group identity or the 
majority status of non-Gitanos (see below) contribute to explaining this finding and the 
                                                 
‡ In fact, in the homogeneous condition, a common comment by Gitano participants during the post-
experimental interview when informally asked about their perception of punishment opportunities (i.e., “the 
possibility of reducing others’ earnings”) was that punishing others makes no sense at all. “Destroying others’ 
money and paying for it!” (subject #25) was seen as something weird, irrational and very negative by Gitanos in 
the homogeneous condition. Comments of this type were inexistent in the mixed condition (as well as in the 
only-non-Gitano homogeneous condition), as if the reasons for punishing others were evident for everyone. In 
fact, even though the beliefs elicitation was not incentivized and should therefore be taken with caution, 
participants’ expectations seem to match their behavior to a large extent: Gitanos expected much less 
punishment than non-Gitanos in the homogeneous groups (p < 0.01; same regression specification as for 
punishment decisions) and expected more punishment in the mixed than in the homogeneous groups (p = 0.05; 
Wald test). 
discrepancy with Gitanos’ punishment behavior, which aligns well with the predictions of 
cultural group selection in both the homogeneous and mixed groups. 
In addition, we find some indication that Gitanos spitefully punished non-Gitano cooperators 
more than Gitano ones (i.e., more antisocial punishment targeted at outgroups than ingroups). 
This result is in line with the prediction of cultural group selection theories as well, but the 
level of antisocial punishment in the mixed groups was perhaps too low to draw any firm 
conclusion. 
Taken together, these results highlight the complexity of inter-ethnic relationships for both the 
provision of public goods and the enforcement of cooperation. The role of majority versus 
minority status of groups, which has been largely overlooked in previous research on 
punishment behavior in intergroup encounters, might be crucial. As mentioned, Gitano non-
cooperators were firmly punished by other (male) Gitanos in mixed groups, but also by (male) 
non-Gitanos. The fact that ethnic minorities, and Romani groups in particular, are often 
perceived as if not following the collective action norms of the majority (46, 50, 54, 55) and 
as potentially violent in their reactions to the majority’s enforcement institutions (51, 52, 57) 
may explain the strong punishment of Gitano wrongdoers by non-Gitano males. This result 
could be reflecting the opportunity provided by the anonymous experimental setting for the 
majority to sanction the minority without fearing retaliation, probably symptomatic of a sense 
of moral superiority (60) or pretended assimilation (61). Further research should explore these 
possibilities in greater depth. Note that non-Gitanos typically do not share such a strong group 
identity as Gitanos due, in part, to their majority status. Indeed, groups’ majority/minority 
status is a predictable, although imperfect, correlate of group identity strength that shapes 
intergroup encounters in many ways (61). Previous evidence indicates that members of 
majority status groups are typically more concerned with not being perceived as prejudiced by 
the minority, whereas members of minority groups are concerned with becoming the target of 
the majority’s prejudice (90, 91). Since an extended stereotype is that Romani people do not 
contribute to the commons and display low compliance with the majority collective action 
norms (46), following those arguments, it might be natural that both non-Gitanos and 
Gitanos, although for different reasons, punish acts that confirm the stereotype (i.e., Gitanos 
not cooperating) more firmly than acts that contradict it (i.e., non-Gitanos free-riding or 
Gitanos cooperating). This would be consistent with our findings. 
An important aspect uncovered by our experiments relates to the impact of gender roles 
within as well as across cultural groups. While females contribute more in mixed than 
homogeneous groups, the opposite is observed for males. Also, in contrast to what we see 
among females, males punish generally more in mixed than homogeneous groups (consistent 
with a “male-warrior” account; 65-67). These two results hold similarly for both Gitano and 
non-Gitano participants, thus suggesting the existence of gender differences common to both 
cultural groups. One candidate proximate force underlying such gender differences is risk 
aversion. If mixed groups are perceived as risky environments due to the presence of 
outgroups, probably the safest strategy is to avoid conflict by cooperating and not punishing 
others (to the extent that the punished individual cannot learn the ethnic identity of the 
punisher, punishment not only of outgroups but also of ingroups may trigger conflict). Since 
there is abundant evidence suggesting that, at least in patriarchal societies, males are less risk 
averse than females (92, 93; for studies suggesting a biologically-informed explanation see, 
for instance, Brañas-Garza et al. (94) and Brañas-Garza & Rustichini (95)), this might explain 
why they tend to use such a strategy to a lesser extent than females. 
However, while non-Gitano females’ punishment was strongly modulated by group type—
high in the homogeneous and low in the mixed groups—Gitano females practically did not 
punish in either condition. This result may be reflecting a culture-specific differential role of 
females and males on norm enforcement. Indeed, the finding is consistent with the evidence 
reviewed in Text S1 suggesting that the Gitano cultural norms prescribe women to reduce 
their assertiveness in the presence of (Gitano) males, who should ostensibly lead social 
interactions in such situations. These marked gender roles are far less prevalent in the 
majority population. 
In sum, while our results are more consistent with cultural group selection theories and their 
associated norm-psychology account than with misfiring-based theories, several findings 
challenge a strict view of how cultural group selection processes should translate into 
behavioral outcomes. These findings in fact raise a number of new questions that deserve 
further exploration. 
 
Methods 
Five semi-rural towns in southern Spain (Granada, Andalusia) with comparable demographic 
characteristics hosted our experiments: Benalúa de Guadix, Darro, Deifontes, Iznalloz and 
Pedro Martínez (see Figure 7a). Recruitment of non-Gitano participants was made through the 
town halls (the activity was publicly announced as a study for the University of Granada, and 
individuals informed the staff about their interest in participating). Town halls however did 
not provide a good means to contact Gitanos since they are typically less involved in towns’ 
official collective activities. To recruit Gitano participants, two of the main researchers visited 
several households in the weeks preceding the experiment and asked the (previously-known) 
family heads to “bring some of their folks”. As a call for participation, there was a €5 show-
up fee and a drink and tapa at the end of the experiment.  
In each location, we ran two experimental sessions in a between-subjects design: one 
ethnically homogeneous session (either all Gitanos, in two locations, or all non-Gitanos, in 
three locations) and one ethnically mixed session (same number of Gitanos and non-Gitanos; 
one session in each of the five locations) where ethnic identity was made salient. We ensured 
that subjects in one session did not learn the ethnic composition of the other session prior to 
participating. In each of the 10 sessions, 32 participants played the PGP in eight independent 
groups of four people. The participants were initially evenly assigned one out of four colors 
using visible colored scarves. Colors were assigned randomly in the homogenous sessions but 
were dependent on ethnicity in the mixed sessions, so that two colors were associated to 
Gitanos and the other two colors to non-Gitanos. This procedure was unknown to participants 
and was done by giving scarves of identical color to participants who showed up together. 
Since Gitanos and non-Gitanos always arrived separately, the resulting assignment of colors 
to ethnic groups was nearly perfect (see below).  
In the mixed sessions, we subtly induced participants to realize the link between colors and 
ethnicities prior to playing the game—in the homogenous sessions we made the composition 
of colors public as well in order to allow for comparability between conditions—: the eight 
participants of each color were placed together wearing their scarves and were photographed 
by an assistant in front of the other participants. This feature of the design allowed 
participants to associate cooperation decisions to ethnicities (i.e., colors) and condition their 
punishment decisions upon the ethnicity of the target in mixed groups. Data from post-
experimental interviews indicate that most participants were able to associate ethnicities to 
scarf colors in the mixed sessions (even if socially-desirable responding might have reduced 
their willingness to acknowledge this). See Figure 7b for a representation of the structure of 
the experiment. 
For the statistical analyses we excluded seven participants; two Gitanos because they 
participated in a homogeneous non-Gitano session by coincidence (we learned their ethnicity 
ex-post) and five individuals from four different mixed sessions because their ethnicity did 
not match their color (including them does not qualitatively affect the results). The final 
sample consisted of 143 Gitanos and 170 non-Gitanos. 
The basic elements of the PGP design have been reported elsewhere (19). Each four-person 
PGP group was composed of one randomly selected person from each color. Beyond colors, 
group membership was unknown. After deciding how much from an endowment of €10 to 
contribute to a public good (marginal per capita return = 0.5; thus each euro contributed cost 
the individual 50 cents but increased the earnings of each of the other three group members’ 
by 50 cents), participants received feedback on their group partners’ contributions and 
earnings in a color-based fashion and could then anonymously reduce other group members’ 
payoffs at a personal cost (cost-to-impact ratio of punishment = 1:3). Finally, participants 
were also asked to state the level of punishment they expected from each group partner (no 
monetary incentives were used for this task). Figures S1 and S2 in the Supplementary 
Information display the contribution and punishment decision cards, respectively.  Several 
examples of all stages of the PGP were displayed on a whiteboard to facilitate understanding 
of the game rules. After the PGP, participants completed an unrelated task. At the end of the 
experiment, participants were privately asked to answer a set of socio-demographic questions 
and received their payment. Mean earnings from the PGP were €13.34 ± €4.08 (SD). 
 
 
Figure 7. Panel (a) Five semi-rural towns in southern Spain (Granada, Andalusia): Benalúa 
de Guadix, Darro, Deifontes, Iznalloz and Pedro Martínez. Panel (b) Structure of the 
experiment. 
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Text S1. A short overview on Spanish Gitanos and further hypotheses 
The Gitanos or Calé§ are an ethnocultural minority who lives today in all Spanish regions. 
They are related to other Romani groups in Europe and America with whom they seem to 
share a remote origin from an “initial founder population” that moved westwards from the 
Indian subcontinent over one thousand years ago (Mendizabal et al. 2012). All these groups, 
however, have adapted to the surrounding groups with whom they have lived and today show 
some traits of familial resemblance and considerable cultural heterogeneity (Matras 2015, 
Piasere 2004, Fraser 1992). Even those who preserve articulated dialects of Romani language 
(Matras 2002) are bilingual, and thus bicultural. The Gitanos come from the first Romani 
migrations into Western Europe, which ended in the second half of the 15th century (Pym 
2007, Leblon 1985). Their lifeways are product of a long coexistence and exchange with local 
Spanish populations. Life in common has been marked by persecution, segregation and 
discrimination, but also by cooperation and hybridization (Pym 2007, Gómez Alfaro 1998, 
1999, Leblon 1985, Gamella 2011, Gamella et al. 2014b).  
In this sense, Gitanos of Spain are often portrayed as an example of successful integration. 
Arguably, their treatment and living conditions are relatively favorable compared to large 
Romani populations living in other European societies, particularly those of Central and 
Eastern Europe. (For instance, George Soros, the business magnate and Roma advocate and 
philanthropist “called upon Spain to lead Europe in bettering the conditions of the Roma” 
[Peiró 2012: ix]. Similar claims have been expressed often in the international mass media.) 
But the rosy view of the lot of the Spanish Romani is often exaggerated and downplays the 
discrimination and exclusion many of them still suffer in labor, income, education and even 
daily life encounters (Álvarez-Roldán et al. 2018). It is true, however, that since 1977, when 
the new political context brought about democracy and decentralization of the Spanish state, 
there have been clear improvements in their access to health care, education and housing, but 
not without conflicts and rejection by local majorities. 
                                                 
§ Most Spanish Romani people call themselves Gitanos both in private and public settings. Minority leaders also 
use the term to name public institutions, such as the Instituto de Cultura Gitana. The first Romani groups 
reaching Spain in the fifteenth century were called “Egyptanos”, as they were considered to originate in Egypt. 
Gitano is thus synonymous with the English term “gypsy”. Many Romani leaders and intellectuals reject this 
exonym as derogatory and prefer to be identified by their own denominations, such as Roma, Sinti, Kalé, etc. In 
Spain, Gitanos also refer to themselves as Calé (plural of Caló, black in Romani), but less frequently. 
Today, most Gitanos are proud of their ethnic identity, although they consider themselves 
autochthonous Spaniards especially in face of the large number of foreign economic 
immigrants who moved into Spain in the last two decades and increased the country’s ethnic 
and cultural diversity. Gitanos speak the languages and dialects of the regions where they live 
and have lost most of their old trades and occupations. They have, however, developed other 
differences to construct and vindicate their shared identity (Gay Blasco 1999, Cantón 2010, 
Gamella et al. 2013, 2014a, 2014b). Gitanos’ identity often shows elements of an 
“oppositional identity” built in opposition or in contrast to the dominant majority culture and 
associated with the status of involuntary minority (Ogbu & Simons 1998). But Gitanos have 
contributed much to Spanish culture and folklore. Perhaps in no other part of Europe has such 
a cultural fusion occurred as in Spain, especially in Andalusia, where many of the symbols 
and practices that identify the region to the world (such as Flamenco singing and dancing) 
have a crucial Gitano component (Leblon 2003, Pasqualino 1998).  
Almost all Spanish Gitanos are sedentary; they have been living in the same towns and 
counties for generations and often have a strong attachment to their places of birth or 
residence, defining themselves as Andalusians, Catalans, or even Sevillanos and Granadinos. 
Informed estimates of the size of the Gitano population put it in the range of 500,000 to 
600,000, around 1.5% of the total Spanish population (FSG 2008). Although in some 
locations, mainly in the southern region of Andalusia, where about 40% of the Spanish 
Gitanos live (even though Andalusia has less than 20% of the total Spanish population), 
Gitanos represent a particularly high fraction of the population. We conducted our study in an 
area of eastern Andalusia. This geographical area was chosen due to its high concentration of 
Gitanos, thus allowing the recruitment of a sufficient number of members of this ethnicity for 
our study. In the five towns hosting the experiments, Gitanos account for about 25.6% of the 
population on average (range: 20.0%–41.4%), that is, about 3,970 over a total of 15,490 
inhabitants, according to our estimates for 2007.  
Some Gitano cultural traits are essential for the understanding of their social behavior, and of 
punishment in particular. Such traits are mainly associated with social organization and 
gender roles. We summarize their differential characteristics in the following lines and 
develop further hypotheses about how some of these cultural traits might translate, as 
proximate-level explanations, into observed behavior in the experiment. 
Social organization and “the family” 
Even considering the growing heterogeneity of Gitanos, their social universe is largely based 
on kinship and marriage relations. Their main social networks are family networks, and these 
tend to be larger, denser, more complex and multifunctional than those of their non-Gitano 
neighbors (or Payos, as Gitanos often refer to them).  
For Gitanos today, their most important institution is “the family”. The particular notion of 
family among the Gitano population encompasses many different meanings, which can be 
summarized across two levels. First, compared to non-Gitanos, Gitanos display relative 
smaller stress in the household or co-resident domestic unit and a more general understanding 
of the “closest family” as including a network of households formed by close kinship links. 
Considering the different moments in the developmental cycle of domestic units, it is possible 
to find, for instance, that a specific couple and their children gravitate heavily and almost 
daily towards the husband’s parents. Thus, a patri-virilocal bias strengthens the patrilineal 
ideology sustained primarily by males (Gay Blasco 1999, Martín & Gamella 2005, Gamella & 
Martín 2007, Gamella 2011). Second, kin networks include a larger number of people due to 
several processes that differ from the majority at large: in particular, (i) higher fertility leading 
to a larger number of siblings and, in turn, aunts-uncles, cousins, second cousins, etc.; and (ii) 
higher consanguinity in marriage that generates a multiplicity of links between members of 
any network, as well as higher network homogeneity (Gamella 2019). 
Inbreeding has indeed been strikingly common among Gitanos, who show a marked 
preference to marry “known”, compatible and “good” people from reliable interrelated kin 
networks. This does not stem only from geographic isolation or inheritance rules and 
patrimonial strategies. Rather, it is more the result of social isolation or segregation, as well as 
a marked cultural preference for endogamy (Gamella 2019).  
It has long been argued that in premodern or “traditional” societies kinship “provides […] an 
organising medium of trust relations.” As such, “kinspeople can usually be relied upon to 
meet a range of obligations more or less regardless of whether they feel personally 
sympathetic towards the specific individuals involved” (Giddens 1990, p. 101), while in 
modern societies relationships of trust have been replaced by “friendship or sexual intimacy 
as a means of stabilising social ties” (p. 102). The dominant idea is that modernity implies 
isolation from kin networks and individuals confront each other as separate entities “divorced 
from their kinship and family units” (Finkler et al. 2001, p. 236). This varies across countries, 
however (Schulz et al. 2018). Precisely, Spain as well as other southern European countries 
are usually portrayed as “familial” societies, where family bonds and support are relatively 
prominent, and individualism is somehow limited by family obligations (Reher 1998). 
Therefore, the distinction between Gitanos and Spaniards at large in this regard might be 
considered as a question of degree rather than as an absolute one. But the density and intensity 
of kin bonds often generate a differential institutional setup and affect the interpretative lens 
shared by local Gitanos. 
Inbreeding is much more common among Gitanos than among Spaniards at large and has 
shown both a distinctive character and evolution. Although Spain once had some of the 
highest levels in Europe, inbreeding began to fall in the 1950s and, in following decades, the 
fall was so rapid that consanguineous marriages have become as rare as in other Western 
countries (Fuster & Colantonio 2002, 2004, Calderon et al. 2009). Within Gitano 
communities, however, inbreeding has been and remains widespread. According to recent 
estimates based on genealogical reconstruction for the period 1925–2006 (Gamella 2019), in 
22 contiguous localities in the area where this study was conducted more than half (54.8%) of 
all Gitano marriages are among relatives, with close-kin consanguineous marriages (up to 
second cousins) averaging 28.7%. An estimation that can be compared to the measures 
reported in studies using interviews or other synchronic research methods yields average 
inbreeding coefficients (Wright’s F) of about 11.3 (x10-3), levels never found in Spain and 
much less so recently. This value is rather conservative, however, and may underestimate the 
actual F by more than 30% in this population. These are among the highest rates of inbreeding 
found in any European population, including the most inbred of Spanish isolates (Gamella 
2019). In the same area, aggregate consanguinity rates for the overall population (including 
Gitanos and non-Gitanos) reached a maximum of around 7.4% between 1920 and 1936, with 
corresponding F coefficients ranging from 2.4 to 2.7 (x10-3). Since the 1960s the rates of 
consanguinity and inbreeding have decreased rapidly (Gamella & Núñez-Negrillo 2019). Note 
that recent comparable estimates for small-scale societies of hunter-gatherer and 
horticulturalists report average F values well below 2 (x10-3) and 10 (x10-3), respectively 
(Walker 2014, Walker & Bailey 2014). Given the strong correlation between coefficients of 
inbreeding and mean relatedness (Hamilton’s r) of groups (Walker 2014), these data 
demonstrate that Romani people of this area are highly genetically related on average, even 
compared with people from small-scale societies. Multiple consanguinity is the norm among 
Gitanos: couples are linked by several bonds and share many ancestors, a product of a pattern 
of inbreeding sustained over many generations. Although these patterns are starting to change 
and the rate of marriages between Gitanos and non-Gitanos is slowly increasing, they have 
remained quite constant in the last decades.  
In sum, even in a region where consanguineous marriages had been important, inbreeding 
among Gitanos shows a particularly high intensity and permanence, as it is the product of a 
strong cultural preference and not only of geographical isolation and poverty. Hence, it is 
somehow reasonable that Gitanos spread that sense of kin to the whole community: “here we 
all are family”; “all Gitanos are related, they share some blood, at least a drop of blood for 
sure”; “distant but relatives”. Neighbors, friends and partners are often family as well. 
The enforcement of norms—a norm-psychology hypothesis 
Regarding norm-enforcement institutions, some Romani groups have formal conflict 
resolution processes and tribunals. Gitano people, however, use more informal systems of 
justice and adjudication of rights to avoid the escalation of violence and blood feuds (San 
Román 1986, 2010). Respected elders, typically men (hombres de razón or hombres de 
respeto: “men of reason” or “men of respect”), are often asked to mediate. Affinal kin 
relationships may also limit the extent and seriousness of conflicts, which have been recurrent 
and feared. Still today a serious conflict (a death) may imply the abandonment of their 
residences by several hundreds of the closest kin of the accused.  
Notwithstanding, Gitanos, both males and females but in different socio-political spheres, 
display a comparatively strong sense of individual autonomy (Gamella 2000, 2011) which, 
added to the possibility of escalation of conflict between families, may restrict the role of 
decentralized overt sanctioning unless key norms are transgressed (Piasere 2012, Matras 
2015, San Román 2010, Gay Blasco 1999, Álvarez-Roldán et al. 2018). This culture of liberty 
or resistance, possibly related to the avoidance of conflict between Gitano families, should be 
associated with a low willingness to punish in homogeneous groups if cultural differences are 
translated into game play as predicted by a norm-psychology account. This proximate-level 
prediction is indeed in line with the basic prediction of the cultural group selection hypothesis, 
which was stated above using an evolutionary perspective. An earlier study with a sample of 
Spanish Gitanos provides preliminary support for this prediction. Brañas-Garza et al. (2006) 
used ultimatum game experiments to examine sharing and punishment behavior in 
anonymous one-shot bilateral interactions between Gitanos in Vallecas, Madrid. Most of them 
did not express any willingness to punish stingy co-ethnics (but see Espín et al. 2012, 2015, 
for combined evidence suggesting that the psychology underlying the rejection of low offers 
in the ultimatum game may differ from that underlying altruistic punishment in the PGP). 
Furthermore, a common rationale of Gitanos who were unwilling to reject unfair, even zero, 
offers was, “What if (s)he needs the money?”. This suggests that sporadic acts of 
uncooperativeness carried out by Gitanos may not per se be considered by other Gitanos as 
deserving peer punishment. 
Gender roles—a norm-psychology hypothesis 
In general, Gitanos are portrayed as a group that sustains relatively conservative or patriarchal 
gender relationships, where women are subordinated to fathers and brothers when they are 
single, and to their husbands and husband’s family when married (San Román 2010, Gay 
Blasco 1999). Care of children, family members and the sick are generally seen as women’s 
primordial tasks, but in this regard there is only a degree of difference with non-Gitanos of 
this area. 
However, the considerable agency developed by Gitano women in their daily lives, both in 
the domestic and public realms, is rarely considered. It is often Gitano women who confront 
authorities in administrative matters, and in the defense of their rights to housing, education or 
public benefits. But they do that somehow as in delegation by their husbands and partners; it 
is part of their accepted gender roles. In confrontational encounters judged as impersonal, 
Gitano women can be very assertive, and their attitudes are often seen as inadequate by 
majority standards, as if they were not following the same patterns of modesty and good 
manners of middle-class Spaniards (Gamella 2000, 2011). This supposed lack of 
accommodation to their subordinate status is part of the generalized anti-Gitano bias that 
reflects important majority norms; a process also found with respect to anti-Roma bias in 
Eastern Europe (Kende et al. 2017). 
But in personal interactions, or in front of Gitano people, the presence of males in public 
encounters somehow transforms the ways most Gitano women will voice their concerns and 
pursue their interests. There exists a number of principles that Gitano women must typically 
follow in these cases: e.g., “never let him lose face in public” or “never contradict him or the 
elders publicly”. If women decide or influence family decisions, as they often do, their role 
has to be more private than public, more by applying reason than violence (Gamella 2000, 
Gamella & Martín 2007). In this sense, while gossiping is a fundamental weapon in the hands 
of women, violence is seen as the prerogative of males in extreme circumstances (Gay Blasco 
1999, San Román 2010). There is obviously a lot of variation among individuals and couples 
in these gender arrangements and age may also play an important moderating role, but this 
norm clearly differs with respect to the majority population. Following the norm-psychology 
account, this cultural difference is hypothesized to be reflected in game behavior in that 
Gitano females should be more reluctant (than non-Gitano ones and males in general) to 
punish others in either condition of the experiment, given that Gitano males are always 
present. 
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Figure S1. Contribution decision card (Yellow #1 participant example; translated from 
Spanish) 
 
Figure S2. Punishment decision card (Yellow #1 participant example; translated from 
Spanish) 
 
 
